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Expanding Credit Access:
Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts
Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman
ABSTRACT
Expanding credit access is a key ingredient of development strategies worldwide.  Microfinance
practitioners, policymakers, and donors have ambitious goals for expanding access, and seek
efficient methods for implementing and evaluating expansion.  There is less consensus on the
role of consumer credit in expansion initiatives.  Some microfinance institutions are moving
beyond entrepreneurial credit and offering consumer loans.  But many practitioners and
policymakers are skeptical about “unproductive” lending.  These concerns are fueled by
academic work highlighting behavioral biases that may induce consumers to over borrow.  We
estimate the impacts of a consumer credit supply expansion using a field experiment and follow-
up data collection.  A South African lender relaxed its risk assessment criteria by encouraging its
loan officers to approve randomly selected marginal rejected applications.  We estimate the
resulting impacts using new survey data on applicant households and administrative data on loan
repayment, as well as public credit reports one and two years later.  We find that the marginal
loans produced significant benefits for borrowers across a wide range of economic and well-
being outcomes.  We also find some evidence that the marginal loans were profitable for the
Lender.  The results suggest that consumer credit expansions can be welfare-improving.
Key Words: Microfinance, credit impact, consumer credit





Expanding access to credit is a key ingredient of development strategies worldwide.  The 
microfinance industry has grown exponentially over the past twenty years under the premise that 
expanding access to credit will help improve the welfare of the poor (Morduch 1999; Armendariz 
de Aghion and Morduch 2005).  This policy push has been driven by both theoretical and 
empirical motivations.  Theoretical models show that information asymmetries can lead to credit 
market failures and ensuing poverty traps (Banerjee and Newman 1993).  Empirical evidence 
shows strong negative correlations between depth of access and poverty rates at the macro level 
(Levine 1997; Honohan 2004), and positive impacts of access to microfinance at the micro level 
(Pitt and Khandker 1998).  Policymakers, practitioners, and funders are committed to continued 
rapid growth. 
There is less consensus on the role of consumer credit in expansion initiatives.  Some 
microfinance institutions are moving beyond “traditional” entrepreneurial credit and offering 
consumer loans.  But many practitioners remain skeptical about “unproductive” lending 
(Robinson 2001).  Policy is similarly conflicted, both within and across countries, and over time.1  
Concerns about the development of consumer credit markets are fueled by academic work 
highlighting behavioral biases that may induce consumers to overborrow.2 
There is also uncertainty about how to expand credit access.  Traditional approaches to 
microcredit expansion— creating new microfinance institutions, adding branches, using joint 
                                                 
1 South Africa offers an example of such conflicted policy approaches.  South Africa deregulated usury 
ceilings in 1992 to encourage the development of formal markets in consumer credit.  However, recent 
legislation re-imposed some ceilings, effective in 2007.  Another example is the substantial variation across 
U.S. states in payday lending restrictions (Consumer Credit Research Foundation 2006).  The United States 
recently passed a binding interest rate ceiling on consumer loans to military personnel and their family 
members.  The law was motivated by the concentration of payday lenders, which offer a shorter-term 
version of the loan product studied in this paper, near military bases; see, e.g., 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday/briefs/page.jsp?itemID=29862357. 
2 For example: Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2005) find that consumers with present-biased 
preferences would commit $2,000 to not borrow on credit cards; Ausubel (1991) argues that over-optimism 
produces excess credit card borrowing; Stango and Zinman (2007b; 2007a) find that consumers 
systematically underestimate the interest rate on short-term installment loans and borrow heavily and 




liability mechanisms to overcome high fixed transaction costs and poor screening, monitoring and 
enforcement capabilities— may not be the most cost-effective method to support efficient 
expansion.  Another way to expand access to credit is simpler: liberalizing screening criteria.3   
We assess the impacts of liberalizing credit screening criteria by analyzing new data 
produced by a field experiment and follow-up survey work and data collection.  The key 
questions are threefold.  First, do credit constraints bind?  Second, does relaxing any credit 
constraints benefit marginal borrowers?  Revealed preference logic says it should: a consumer 
borrows only if she will benefit (weakly, in expectation).  Behavioral models say not necessarily: 
biases in preferences and cognition may lead consumers to overborrow.  The third key question is 
whether the lender profits from making these marginal loans. 
The experiment was implemented by a consumer lender in a high-rate, high-risk South 
African installment loan market where credit constraints appear to bind.  First-time applicants are 
often rejected, even at prevailing real rates of 200% APR.  Default rates average about 20% 
among new borrowers.  A prior experiment on experienced borrowers from the same lender 
found far greater sensitivity to maturity than price (Karlan and Zinman 2006a); as Attanasio, 
Goldberg, and Kryiazidou (2004) show formally, this pattern of elasticities is further evidence of 
unmet demand for credit. 
Measuring the causal impacts of credit expansion on borrower and lender outcomes is usually 
complicated by deep identification issues.  Two types of endogeneity are particularly 
problematic: the self-selection of clients into loan contracts, and targeted interventions by lenders 
and policymakers.  These problems make it difficult to draw firm conclusions from non-
experimental studies without strong assumptions.  A classic example concerns relatively 
“spunky” individuals selecting or being selected into microcredit borrowing, and thereby 
                                                 
3 Liberalization of screening criteria is used in directed lending programs (Banerjee and Duflo 2004), semi-
directed lending programs (e.g., the Community Reinvestment Act in the United States), and by many 





confounding any causal effect of access to credit with the causal effects of individual 
characteristics (including those that may change unobservably over time).  Selection can work in 
the opposite direction as well; e.g., if households (lenders) tend to take (target) microcredit in 
anticipation of needing to smooth upcoming negative shocks.  Attempts to overcome these 
problems using quasi-experimental, structural, and control function approaches have yielded 
mixed results.4  
We addressed the identification problem by working with a lender to engineer exogenous 
variation in the loan approval process.  Our treatment randomly encouraged loan officers to 
approve some marginal applications.  Specifically, the Lender added three additional steps to its 
normal process for new loan applicants.  First, loan officers were required to label rejected 
applications as either egregiously uncreditworthy or marginally uncreditworthy.  Second, the loan 
officer’s computer then instructed the loan officer to reconsider some marginal applications in 
real-time by randomly producing a message to “approve” or “still reject.”  Loan officers were 
instructed by management to follow the computer’s instructions in all cases.  But in the third and 
final step, loan officers had pecuniary incentives to be risk-averse and approved the loan in only 
53% of the cases when the computer instructed them to approve.  Consequently our design 
identifies treatment-on-the-treated effects of expanding access on a policy- and strategy-relevant 
sample: those applicants deemed by loan officers to be closest to the margin of creditworthiness.  
Neither the treatment (computer said “approve”) nor the control (computer said “reject”) groups 
were informed by the Lender that a component of the loan decision was randomized.   
We then estimate the average impacts of expanding credit access by comparing outcomes 
across applicants assigned to the treatment and control groups.  Our outcome data comes from the 
                                                 
4 Studies in developing countries include Coleman (1999), Kaboski and Townsend (2005), McKernan 
(2002), Pitt, Khandker, Chowdury, and Millimet (2003b), and Pitt and Khandker (1998). These studies 
focus on microentrepreneurial credit rather than consumer credit. However there may be little economic 
distinction between small, closely-held businesses and the households that run them, and there is some 
evidence the microentrepreneurial loans are often used for consumption smoothing (Morduch 1998; Menon 
2003).  A growing literature uses natural experiments to study the impact of payday loans in the U.S.: 




Lender’s records on repayment and profitability, from credit bureau reports over two years after 
the start of the experiment, and from household surveys conducted by an independent firm at the 
home or workplace of the marginal applicants six to twelve months after the start of the 
experiment.  The survey measures borrowing activity, loan uses, and a range of proxies for 
household well-being. 
Our results corroborate the presence of binding liquidity constraints.  Control applicants did 
not simply obtain credit elsewhere; conversely, treated applicants borrowed more overall in the 6-
12 months following the experiment, and changed their lender type composition. 
Measuring the ultimate impacts of consumer credit on borrowers presents several challenges.  
There is no natural summary statistic for household utility; hence we follow evaluations of social 
policy interventions and measure treatment effects on a range of variables that capture economic 
behavior and subjective well-being (Kling, Liebman et al. forthcoming).  But treatment effect 
channels may vary across households; e.g., some households may smooth consumption by 
making critical purchases, others may use loan proceeds to maintain employment in the face of 
adverse shocks to transportation or family health, others may make investments as more 
traditionally defined (in self-employment, housing, schooling, or health), while others may 
benefit in less-tangible ways (becoming more hopeful about future prospects, or acquiring more 
bargaining power in the household).  Consequently we use summary index tests that aggregate 
across outcomes to address the problem of multiple inference (Anderson 2007; Kling, Liebman et 
al. forthcoming). 
We find that expanded access to credit significantly improved average outcomes.  Over the 6 
to 12 month horizon, applicants in the treatment group were significantly more likely to retain 
their job over the study period, and treatment group incomes were significantly higher.  Treated 
households were also less likely to experience hunger, and had more positive outlooks on their 
prospects and position.  We do find a significant and negative impact on other aspects of mental 




subjective outcomes is significant and positive.  Over 15 to 27 month horizons, we find a positive 
impact on having a credit score, and no impact on the score itself.  The effects on credit scores 
cast doubt on the hypothesis that positive treatment effects will turn negative over longer horizons 
due to debt traps or other delayed realizations of the cost of borrowing. 
Perhaps most critically, the confidence intervals for treatment effects on our summary 
impacts (the overall index of survey outcomes, and credit scores) rule out substantial negative 
effects.  This is important because the default policy regime for consumer credit is restricted 
access based on the presumption of negative effects on the margin.5 
The Lender agreed to implement this experiment because its senior management believed that 
branch staff applied inefficiently strict underwriting criteria.6  Our estimates of loan returns 
suggest that this prior was well-founded.  The evidence suggests that the marginal loans were 
profitable in an absolute sense, although substantially less profitable than inframarginal loans.  
Exactly how profitable depends on several assumptions about marginal costs and risk-weighting.7 
In all our results suggest a role for welfare-improving interventions in consumer credit 
markets but come with other important caveats.  We only directly measure the ultimate borrower 
outcomes of interest at 6 to 12 month horizons, and some costs and/or benefits may only 
materialize over longer horizons.  The external validity of treatment effects in the South African 
cash loan market is unknown. 
Despite these limitations, our results and methodology offer some novel insights into the 
motivation, design, and evaluation of credit market interventions.  We demonstrate that 
randomized-controlled trials can be used to help identify the severity of liquidity constraints, and 
                                                 
5 This stands in contrast to microenterprise credit, which is often subsidized, and hence raises the issue of 
evaluating any benefits of expanded access with respect to the opportunity cost of subsidies. 
6 Prior work suggests that indeed that there was no reason to expect that the Lender’s risk assessment 
methods would be fully optimized.  See Gross and Souleles (2002) for a specific example, and Allen, 
DeLong, and Saunders (2004) for a review and discussion of the challenges of retail credit risk assessment 
and the shortcomings of various methods, including relationship lending and credit scoring. 
7 We cannot simply apply the market test of whether more aggressive underwriting criteria was adopted in 
steady-state, because the Lender was merged into a bank holding company before the results of the 




to evaluate efforts to expand credit access.  Most practically, our results suggest that liberalizing 
screening criteria can benefit both borrowers and lenders, and our methodology demonstrates 
how lenders can hone in on their sustainability/outreach frontier by taking controlled risks using 
randomized experimentation. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides background information the applicants, 
the Lender, and the cash loan market.  Section III details the design and implementation of our 
experiment and data collection methods and empirical strategy.  Section IV presents estimates of 
treatment effects on borrowing and credit access.  Section V presents estimates of treatment 
effects on component and summary index measures of ultimate outcomes of interest.  It also 
presents our estimates of effects on credit scores 15-27 months after treatment, and details our 
estimates of Lender profits on marginal and inframarginal loans.  Section VI concludes with a 
discussion of external validity and other questions for future research. 
 
II. Market and Lender Overview 
 
Our cooperating Lender operated for over 20 years as one of the largest, most profitable micro-
lenders in South Africa.8  It competed in a “cash loan” or “microloan” industry segment that 
offers small, high-interest, short-term, uncollateralized credit with fixed repayment schedules to a 
“working poor” population.  Aggregate outstanding loans in the microloan market equal 
approximately 38% of non-mortgage consumer credit (Department of Trade and Industry South 
Africa 2003). 
Cash loan borrowers typically lack the credit rating and/or collateralizable wealth needed to 
borrow from traditional institutional sources such as commercial banks.  Cash loan sizes tend to 
be small relative to the fixed costs of underwriting and monitoring them, but substantial relative 
to borrower income.  For example, the median loan size made under this experiment ($127) was 
                                                 





40% of the median borrower’s gross monthly income.9  Our sample for this experiment includes 
mostly first-time loan applicants of African descent.  Table 1 shows some comparative 
demographics.  Table 4 shows that borrowers finance a variety of different consumption 
smoothing and investment activities. 
Cash lenders arose to substitute for traditional “informal sector” moneylenders following 
deregulation of the usury ceiling in 1992, and they are regulated by the Micro Finance Regulatory 
Council.  Cash lenders focusing on the observably highest-risk market segment typically make 
one-month maturity loans at 30% interest per month.  Informal sector moneylenders charge 30-
100% per month.  Lenders targeting observably lower risk segments charge as little as 3% per 
month.10 
The cash loan market has important differences and similarities with “traditional” microcredit 
(e.g., the Grameen Bank, other NGOs, and government lending programs).  In contrast to our 
setting, most microcredit has been delivered by lenders with explicit social welfare and targeting 
goals.  Microlenders typically target female entrepreneurs and often use group liability 
mechanisms.  On the other hand, the industrial organization of microcredit is trending steadily in 
the direction of the for-profit, more competitive delivery of individual, untargeted credit that 
characterizes the cash loan market (Robinson 2001; Porteous 2003).  This push is happening both 
from the bottom-up (non-profits converting to for-profits) as well as from the top-down (for-
profits expanding into microcredit segments).    
Our cooperating Lender’s product offerings were somewhat differentiated from competitors.  
Unlike many cash lenders, it did not pursue collection or collateralization strategies such as direct 
debit from paychecks, or physically keeping bank books and ATM cards of clients.  Its pricing 
was transparent and linear, with no surcharges, application fees, or insurance premiums added to 
                                                 
9 Throughout the paper we convert all South Africa currency into US dollars using the average exchange 
rate over our study period of September 21, 2004-November 30, 2005: 6.31 Rand= $1. 





the cost of the loan.  The Lender also had a “medium-maturity” product niche in 4-month 
installment loans.  Most other cash lenders focus on 1-month or 12+-month loans.11  In this 
experiment 98% of the borrowers received the standard loan for first-time borrowers: a 4-month 
maturity at 11.75% per month, charged on the original balance (200% APR).  Interest was 
charged up front (using the “add-on” practice common in consumer loan markets), and the loan 
was then amortized into 4 equal monthly repayments.12 
Per standard practice in the cash loan market, the Lender conducted underwriting and 
transactions in its branch network.  Its risk assessment technology combined centralized credit 
scoring with decentralized discretion.  The credit scoring model screened out severely unqualified 
applicants and produced a recommendation on whether to approve the application.  Branch 
personnel made the final decision.  The Lender rejected fifty percent of new applications for 
reasons including unconfirmed employment, suspicion of fraud, poor credit rating, and excessive 
debt burden. 
Applicants who were approved often defaulted on their loan obligation (see Section V-D), 
despite facing several incentives to repay.  Carrots included decreasing prices and increasing 
future loan sizes following good repayment behavior.  Sticks included reporting to credit bureaus, 




Our research design first randomly assigns a “second look” to some marginal rejected 
applications, and then uses data from the lender, a credit bureau, and household surveys to 
                                                 
11 The Lender also had 1, 6, 12, and 18 month products, with the longer maturities offered at lower rates 
and restricted to the most observably creditworthy customers. 
12 So a R1,000 loan had monthly repayments of (1000+1000*0.1175*4)/4 = R367.50.  Borrowers that 
prepaid paid add-on interest pro-rated to the time outstanding; e.g., a borrower who stayed current and 
prepaid her remaining amount at the end of month two would have repaid R367.50 in month one, plus 





measure impacts on profitability, credit access, investment, and well-being.  The household data 
are collected by a survey firm with no ties to the lender. 
 
A. Experimental Design and Implementation  
Sample and time frame for the experiment 
We drew our sample frame from the universe over 3,000 “new” applicants who had no prior 
borrowing from the Lender and applied at any of 8 branches between September 21 and 
November 20, 2004.  The branches were located in the Capetown, Port Elizabeth, and Durban 
areas.  The Lender maintained normal marketing procedures by advertising on billboards, park 
benches, the radio, and newspapers. 
Our sample frame was comprised of “marginal” applicants: new, rejected, but potentially 
creditworthy.  Specifically, applicants were eligible for the loan randomization if they were 
rejected under the Lender’s normal underwriting criteria but not deemed egregiously 
uncreditworthy by a loan officer.  787 applicants met these criteria. 
The motivation for experimenting with credit supply increases on a pool of marginal 
applicants is twofold.  First, it focuses on those who should be targeted by initiatives to expand 
access to credit.  Second, it provides the Lender with information about the expected profitability 
of changing its underwriting in a way that induces branch personnel to approve more risky loans.  
 
Experimental Design and Operations  
The Lender implemented the experiment in four steps: 
 First, loan officers evaluated each of the over 3,000 new applicants using the Lender’s 
standard underwriting process and three additional steps.  Under normal operations the loan 
officer would use a combination of a credit scoring model and her own discretion to make a 
binary approve/reject decision.  The experiment forced loan officers to take the first additional 




treatment; “egregious” rejects would not be assigned a loan under any circumstances.  Egregious 
rejects were identified subjectively, based on extremely poor credit history, overindebtedness, 
suspected fraud, lack of contactability, or legal problems.  Loan officers approved about 1,700 
new applications processed by participating branches during our study period.  705 applications 
were deemed egregious rejects, leaving us with a sample frame of 787 marginally rejected 
applicants for the experiment. 
Second, special “randomizer” software encouraged loan officers to reconsider randomly 
selected marginal rejects.  Loan officers inputted basic information (name, credit history, 
maximum feasible loan size if approved, and reason for rejection) on each of the 787+705 = 
1,492 rejected applications into the randomizer.  The randomizer then used the inputted 
information to treat applications with probabilities that were conditional on the credit score and 
loan officer assessment.  The treatment was simply a message on the computer screen that the 
application had been “approved” (control applicants remained “rejected”).  The 705 egregious 
applications had zero probability of being treated.  The 787 marginal applicants were divided into 
two groups based on their credit score.  Those with better credit scores were treated with 
probability 0.50, and those with worse credit scores were treated with probability 0.25 (all 
analysis controls for this condition of the randomization).  Table 2, Panel A, Column 1 
corroborates that randomizer treatment assignments generated observably similar treatment and 
control groups.  In total, 325 applicants were assigned to the treatment group, leaving 462 in the 
control group. 
Last, the branch manager made the final credit decision and announced it to the applicant.  
The applicant was not privy to the loan officer’s initial decision, the existence of the software, or 
the introduction of a randomized step in the decision-making process. 
We describe the randomizer’s treatment as “encouragement to reconsider” rather than 
“randomized approval” because loan officers had pecuniary incentives to be risk-averse and not 




pecuniary incentives with randomizer compliance (note we use the term “compliance” in the 
econometric sense, not in a layman sense, since the bank officers were not forbidden from 
refusing the suggestion from the randomizer software).  Instead we relied on training and 
persuasion, and we also monitored the compliance rate in order to gauge how strong this policy 
change would be in relaxing lending criteria.  Table 2, Panel B shows the compliance rates.  Not 
surprisingly compliance was high in the control (still rejected) group: only 2% of these applicants 
received a loan during the experimental period.  But compliance was middling for the treatment 
(approve) group: only 53% actually received a loan. 
Imperfect compliance motivates conducting our analysis on an “intent-to-treat” basis, since 
we do not know which control group applicants would have passed the branch manager’s final 
subjective approval step.  Hence we compare those assigned to treatment to those assigned to 
control, regardless of whether the branch adhered to the random assignment (please see Section 
III-D for more details, and Section V-B for discussion of treatment-on-the-treated estimates).  
Accepted applicants were offered an interest rate, loan size, and maturity per the Lender’s 
standard underwriting criteria.  Recall that nearly all received the standard contract for first-time 
borrowers: a 4-month maturity at 200% APR.  Loan repayment was monitored and enforced 
according to normal operations.  Branch manager compensation was based in part on loan 
performance, and as noted above the experiment did not change incentive pay. 
 
B.  Household Data Collection 
Following the experiment, we hired a firm to survey applicants in the treatment and control 
groups.  The purpose of the survey was to measure behavior and outcomes that might be affected 
by access to credit.  As detailed in Section V-A, the surveyors asked questions on demographics, 
resources, recent investments, employment status, income, consumption, and subjective well-
being.13   
                                                 




The sample frame for the household survey included the entire pool of 787 marginal 
applicants from the experiment.  Surveyors completed 626 surveys, for an 80% response rate.  In 
73 of these cases the targeted respondent (i.e., the loan applicant) could not be located, and 
someone else from the household was surveyed.  In order to avoid potential response bias 
between the treatment and control groups, neither the survey firm nor the respondents were 
informed about the experiment or any association with the Lender.  We told the survey firm that 
the target households’ contact information came from a “consumer database in South Africa.”  
Surveyors were trained to conduct a generic household survey, with emphasis on family finances, 
and the respondent consent form reflected this. 
Each survey was conducted within six to twelve months of the date that the applicant entered 
the experiment by applying for a loan and being placed in the marginal group.  Our rationale for 
this timing is threefold.  First, it avoids one type of mechanical timing bias in favor of finding 
positive impacts on credit access, by allowing sufficient time for the control group applicants to 
find credit elsewhere.  Second, it avoids another type of mechanical timing bias in favor of 
finding positive impacts on credit access by evaluating impacts well after the maturity date on the 
marginal loans.  This ensures that we do not simply measure an initial spike of consumption, and 
that we can observe which marginal borrowers defaulted on their loans.  Third, the 6-12 month 
horizon (partially) allows for the fact that certain investments have a gestation period before they 
manifest in outcomes.  In short, we have chosen to evaluate “medium-run” rather than immediate 
impacts.  To measure longer-term effects, after 15 to 27 months we obtained credit reports from a 
credit bureau for each of the applicants in the experiment (see Section V-C). 
  
C. Experimental Validity 
Our methodology has two experimental validity or interpretation issues.  One relates to the 
possibility of attrition bias.  Another relates to imperfect adherence to the random assignment.  




The first experimental validity issue is whether our follow-up survey sampling strategy 
produces attrition bias.  As noted above, our methodology requires obtaining survey data on both 
treatment and control households.  Our experimental variation is sufficient to identify unbiased 
estimates of the impact of getting a loan on survey outcomes only if treatment assignment is 
uncorrelated with the probability of completing a survey.  Table 2, Panel A, Column 3 
corroborates that this condition holds: treatment status is uncorrelated with the survey response. 
The second experimental validity or interpretation issue arises due to the non-compliance: 
cases where the administered treatment deviates from the assigned one.  Note here that some non-
compliance in the econometric sense (non-treatment in the treatment group) makes good business 
strategy sense.  “Non-compliance” whereby branch personnel cherry-picks the best prospects 
from a pool of randomly selected marginal applicants is indeed an experiment of interest for 
lenders where branch personnel have the final say on credit decisions.  This setup tests the 
profitability of “encouraging” branch personnel to make more marginal loans, while still allowing 
them final subjective decision-making power.  Mechanisms for encouragement include 
incentives, training, and monitoring. 
As discussed above, we anticipated substantial non-compliance and sought to maximize 
econometric power by obtaining the highest feasible approval level (through training and 
monitoring loan personnel).  Table 2, Panel B shows the relationship between treatment 
assignment and administration. 
 
D. Intention-To-Treat Estimates for Component Outcomes 
The imperfect treatment in the treatment group motivates an intention-to-treat (ITT) 
estimator.  ITT produces an unbiased estimate of average treatment effects even when there is 
substantial noncompliance.  We implement ITT using the following OLS specification: 




Y is a behavior or outcome of interest k for applicant i (or i’s household).  Examples of Y include 
measures of borrowing (Table 3), poverty status (Table 5), and loan repayment (Table 8).  
Treatmenti = 1 if the individual was assigned to treatment (irrespective of compliance).  Riski 
captures the applicant’s credit score; this determined whether the applicant was treated with 
probability 0.25 or 0.50.  Appmonthi is the month in which the applicant entered the experiment 
(September, October, or November 2004), and surveymonthi is the month in which the survey 
was completed.  These month variables control for the possibility that the lag between application 
and survey is correlated with both treatment status and outcomes.14 
 
E. Inference Over Multiple Outcomes: Summary Index Tests 
Two concerns arise when using equation (1) to conduct statistical inference over multiple 
outcomes.  One is Type I error(s).  The probability that one or more treatment effects is labeled 
statistically significant due to chance is increasing in the number of outcomes (i.e., in the number 
of tests preformed).  The second concern is evaluating the overall direction and magnitude of the 
treatment effects when there is a diffuse set of outcomes.  We address these concerns using 
summary index tests. 
Following Kling et al (forthcoming), we construct summary indices at two levels: 1) domains 
of related outcomes, and 2) an overall measure that aggregates all of our ultimate outcomes of 
interest.  Our domains are: economic self-sufficiency (income and employment status), food 
consumption, investment (in housing, education, and self-employment), physical health, mental 
health, and outlook and control (optimism, intra-household decision power, and self-perception of 
community status). 
We construct indices by first rescaling each outcome Ykij (outcome k, for individual i, in 
domain j) so that higher values map into better outcomes.  Next we standardize each outcome into 
                                                 
14 This could occur if control applicants were harder to locate (e.g., because we could not provide updated 
contact information to the survey firm), and had poor outcomes compared to the treatment group (e.g., 




a z-score by subtracting its control group mean, and dividing by its standard deviation.15  Then we 
combine outcomes in a domain j by taking the average of equally-weighted standardized 
components.  Then our summary index analog to equation (1) is: 
(2)   Yji = α + βjassignmenti +  δriski + φappmonthi + γsurveymonthi + εi 
Where Yji is an average z-score: the average of standardized component outcomes in domain j. 
 
F. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
The average intention-to-treat effect is captured by βk in equation 1, or βj in equation 2.  As 
noted above, using the random assignment (ITT), rather than whether the borrower actually 
obtained a loan, avoids any bias from noncompliance with the assignment to treatment and 
control. 
We also estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by splitting the sample on characteristics of 
interest.  The gender of the borrower is interesting because many microfinance organizations 
target women, and women are often believed to have differential access to both formal and 
informal financial services.  Household income is interesting because there is often tension in 
microfinance between “sustainability” (profitability) and “outreach” (expanding credit supply) to 
the “poorer of the poor” (Morduch 1999; Morduch 2000).  Little is known about where impacts 
are strongest.  Treatment effects may be stronger on the relatively poor if they are relatively credit 
constrained.  Alternatively, treatment effects may be weaker on the relatively poor if they lack 
complementary skills or resources.  Similarly, we also split the sample by ex-ante credit risk as 
measured by the Lender’s matrix of internal and external credit scores.   
                                                 
15 Following Kling et al, in constructing indices we impute missing outcomes using the mean of the 
individual’s assigned treatment group.  For most outcomes and domains we have few missing values and 
hence do little imputation; one can see this by comparing the sample sizes for the individual outcomes in 
Table 5 to our surveyed sample size of 626.  As Kling et al note (in their footnote 11), this rule “results in 
differences between treatment and control means of an index being the same as the average of treatment 
and control means of the components of that index (when the components are divided by their control 
group standard deviation and have no missing value imputation), so that the index can be interpreted as the 
average of results for separate measures scaled to standard deviation units.” We do resort to substantial 





G. External Validity re: Sample and Time Horizon 
There are two main external validity issues to consider when interpreting our findings. 
One external validity issue is the representativeness of our sample.  As with most empirical 
work, our findings are directly applicable to our sample only.  Of course our sample is a subset of 
larger populations of interest: principally, those with physical access to microfinance who are 
being screened out by current industry criteria (or new regulatory restrictions).  The Introduction 
and Conclusion discuss some related markets and policy issues in both developing and developed 
countries. 
The second external validity issue relates to measuring treatment effects using a single 
snapshot on outcomes.  Section III-B details why we chose 6-12 months.  We address the 
possibility of time-varying treatment effects in Section V-C. 
 
IV. Results: Impacts on Borrowing and Credit Access 
 
This section reports treatment effects of the Lender’s supply expansion on marginal applicants’ 
overall access to credit.  Additional lending by the Lender is unlikely to affect borrowers 
materially unless credit constraints bind.  If rejected applicants can simply obtain a loan from a 
different lender (at similar terms), then we will not find a treatment effect on borrowing, and 
hence would not expect to find treatment effects on investment or ultimate outcomes. 
Table 3 reports treatment effects on borrowing outcomes.  We find no significant effect on 
the extensive margin of overall borrowing: treated households were not more likely to have 
obtained a loan in the 6-12 months after applying to the Lender (Panel A, “all sources”).  But 
treated households did respond on the intensive margin of overall borrowing: Panel A shows a 
significantly higher quantity of loans from all sources (the total number of loans per person rises 




Both the extensive and intensive margins also show a change in the type of credit accessed.  
Treated households were more likely to report borrowing from a microlender (our Lender falls 
into that classification) and less likely to report borrowing from other formal sources (banks, 
NGOs and retailers).  The normative implications of this result are not clear in isolation.  We lack 
good data on loan costs for the individual loans, and rates charged by other formal lenders can 
vary widely both within and across different source types.16  But together with data on 
investments and ultimate outcomes (Section V) we can examine whether the changes in 
borrowing opportunities produced by the treatment actually benefited households.17 
Table 3, Panel A also shows limited evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects.  We find 
several instances where the treatment effect is significant in one sub-sample but not another.  
However the differences across males and females, income groups, and credit score bins are not 
statistically significant. 
Table 3, Panel B presents treatment effects on what we label “perception of credit access.”  
Specifically, the survey asked: “If you needed a loan tomorrow, where would you go to borrow?”  
Treated applicants were 12.8 percentage points more likely to report “Microlender or Cash 
lender” than the control group.  Treated households were 11.2 percentage points less likely to 
report an informal source (friends, family, moneylender, or borrowing circle).  Both effects are 
statistically significant with 99% confidence.  These results are consistent with expanded access 
to formal credit changing the marginal source of borrowing from informal to formal. 
                                                 
16 The survey did not ask the respondent to identify the specific lender.  Surveyors did ask for the interest 
rate on each loan, but response rates were very low. 
17 Another limitation of our data is that it almost certainly and dramatically understates the prevalence of 
informal borrowing (compare to South African Financial Diaries data at www.financialdiaries.com).  If, as 
commonly believed, microloan borrowing serves as a (less expensive) substitute for informal borrowing in 
South Africa, then this implies that our data: 1) overstates the positive impacts on overall borrowing, and 2) 
misses a negative impact on informal borrowing.  See the Conclusion for additional discussion of 




The last row of results in Panel B addresses whether the change in marginal source is due 
(partly) to formal access crowding-out informal access.18  Specifically, the survey asked: “In an 
emergency could you or your spouse/partner get financial assistance from any friends or 
relatives?”  The point estimate suggests that the treatment did reduce access to informal markets 
by 6.2 percentage points (8.6%), although the result is not statistically significant. 
Table 3, Panel B also shows some heterogeneity in treatment effects on perception of credit 
access.  The results suggest that female, poor, and risky applicants are all relatively more likely to 
make cash loans their marginal source of credit as a result of the treatment.  Relatively wealthier 
and more creditworthy applicants are more likely to lose access to informal credit markets as a 
result of the treatment.  Again, the standard errors are large and do not rule out homogenous 
treatment effects. 
 
V.  Results: Loan Uses, and Ultimate Impacts 
 
Table 4 shows the range of activities households report financing in the survey.  These loan uses 
motivate estimating treatment effects on a particular set of investments and economic outcomes.  
We then also estimate treatment effects on various measures of subjective well-being.  In each 
case we scale outcomes such that positive coefficients on the intention-to-treat variable (where 1= 
assigned a loan) indicate positive treatment effects.  Details on how we construct outcome 
measures from the survey data can be found in the Data Appendix.  Estimated treatment effects 
for each “component” survey outcome are reported in Table 5. 
As discussed in Section III-E, the large set of component outcomes that could be affected by 
access to consumer credit motivates aggregating across outcomes and then estimating treatment 
effects on these summary indices (Table 6).  Recall that each index component is a z-score, and 
that each index value is the average z-score of its component outcomes for the given individual.  
                                                 




Consequently our estimate of the treatment effect for index j is an estimate of the average effect 
on each outcome in j, in standard deviation units. 
 
A.  Loan Uses, and ITT Results on Ultimate Outcomes 
Table 4 shows that the most common purpose for household borrowing is paying off other debt.  
This suggests that marginal microloans may be used to economize on interest expenses, and to 
maintain access to other credit sources by permitting timely repayment.  These and other reported 
uses suggest estimating treatment effects on consumption.   
Measuring total consumption requires far more survey time than we could allot (Deaton and 
Zaidi 1999), given the many other outcomes of interest, so we focus on measuring two simple 
measures of food consumption.  One is whether anyone in the household experienced hunger in 
the past 30 days (14% of households in the sample reported some hunger).  The other is whether 
the quality of food consumed by the household improved over the last 12 months (26% reported 
an improvement).  Households randomly assigned a loan were an estimated 5.8 percentage points 
less likely to report hunger (with a p-value of 0.03), and 3.7 percentage points more likely to 
report a food quality improvement (although this estimate was not statistically significant, with a 
p-value of only 0.32).  Again, recall that these measures were taken well after the initial loan 
repayments were due on the marginal loans, so these treatment effects are not simply picking up a 
very transitory spike in consumption.  Combining the two measures of consumption into a 
summary index (Table 6) produces a significant estimated treatment effect of 0.12 standard 
deviation units.   
Table 4 shows that the next most common purpose for household borrowing is transportation 
expenses (19.4%); this and the clothing category are consistent with work-related investments.  
Indeed we find large treatment effects on employment: treated applicants were 11 percentage 
points (13%) more likely to be working at the time of the survey.  Since everyone in our sample 




treatment effect operates by enabling households to maintain employment by smoothing or 
avoiding shocks that prevent them from getting to work.  Two related results (not shown) are 
consistent with this mechanism.  First, questions on job history reveal that treated applicants were 
indeed significantly less likely to report leaving a job since entering the experiment.  The point 
estimate (-2.8 percentage points, with a standard error of 1.4pp) is smaller than the estimated 
effect on employment status, but the confidence intervals do overlap.  Second, we find a positive 
point estimate (+ 2.1 percentage points, with a standard error of 2.5pp) on the likelihood that 
treated households repaired their car in recent months.  And again the confidence interval 
overlaps with the one for the treatment effect on employment. 
The effects on employment, and microfinance’s focus on poverty reduction, motivates 
estimating treatment effects on income as well.  Measuring income accurately in developing 
country settings tends to be difficult (Deaton and Zaidi 1999), and so we focus on relatively 
discrete measures in hopes of mitigating noise.  One measure is the household’s percentile in the 
survey sample distribution of employment earnings since entering the experiment.19  Another 
measure is whether total household income exceeds the poverty line.  We find positive treatment 
effects on both measures.  Households randomly assigned a loan earned an estimated 5 percentile 
points more income (p-value = 0.06), which translates to an increase of roughly R3,500 (or 16% 
of median income) in the middle of the sample distribution.  Treated households were 7.4 
percentage points (p-value = 0.07) more likely to fall above the poverty line, a 12% increase over 
the sample mean (or equivalently, a 19% reduction in the number of households in poverty).   
Table 6 combines our three measures of employment and income into an “economic self-
sufficiency” index.  The overall treatment effect is positive, large (0.19 standard deviation units), 
                                                 
19 The functional form of the earnings distribution makes it such that our OLS estimator puts more weight 
on the bottom part of the income distribution, where the income level difference between percentiles is 
smaller, than on the rightward part of the income distribution, where starting around the 75th percentile the 




and highly significant (p-value = 0.002).  The sub-group estimates (recall that our income split is 
based on income prior to the treatment) suggest homogeneous treatment effects. 
The loan uses table also suggests estimating treatment effects on certain investments.20  
13.7% of loans are used for educational expenses.21  Households report almost perfect attendance 
among compulsory school-aged children, so we focus on university attendance for households 
with any member between ages 18 and 26.  The estimated treatment effect is essentially zero, and 
imprecisely estimated.  Another frequent use of loan proceeds is housing expenses (11.5%).  We 
estimate that treated households were 4 percentage points (13%) more likely to purchase or 
improve a house since entering the experiment (Table 5), with a p-value of 0.30.  We also 
estimate the treatment effect on self-employment in the household.  It is plausible that cash loans 
are a viable option for financing self-employment even at 200% APR, since microentrepreneurial 
credit is very scarce in South Africa, and the returns to microenterprises may be very high for the 
relatively poor and credit constrained in developing countries (de Mel, McKenzie et al. 2007).  
Reported prevalence of using loan proceeds to finance business activity is low (3.2%), but may be 
underreported (since some consumer lenders actively discourage “informal sector” employment), 
or subsumed in other categories.  We estimate that the likelihood of self-employment is 2 
percentage points (13%) higher in the full sample, but with a  p-value of only 0.5.  However, ex-
ante low-income treated applicants were an estimated 9 percentage points more likely to be self-
employed, with a p-value of 0.07.  The point estimate is large, given the mean self-employment 
rate of 15.7% among low-income households in our sample. 
                                                 
20 Many households report financing events, but the nature of these events—holidays, initiations, funerals, 
weddings— makes it unsurprising that the extensive margin (the probability of occurrence) is not affected 
by access to credit (results not reported).  Given measurement error we have little hope of identifying any 
treatment effect on the intensive margin (event spending), so we do not include events in our analysis. 
21 Educational expenses may be predictable, but other expenses and income may not; i.e., (treated) 




Table 6 shows that the estimated treatment effect on our “investment” index—combining 
self-employment, housing, and university attendance— is small, positive, and insignificant.22 
We also estimate treatment effects on various subjective measures of well-being.  We start by 
estimating treatment effects on three outcomes we group together as “control and outlook.”  One 
outcome is a measure of decision-making power.  Many microfinance initiatives seek to increase 
the intra-household bargaining power of female borrowers.23  Here we find point estimates that 
are consistent with positive effects on borrowers of both genders, although the treatment effect on 
females is imprecisely estimated (Table 5).  Our sample size is relatively small here because we 
asked the decision power questions of married targeted respondents only.  We also construct a 
standard, linear measure of optimism using a battery of questions from the psychology literature.  
We find insignificant, positive, and small estimated treatment effects: the largest magnitude 
contained in the 95% confidence interval implies only a 5% increase in optimism.  The third 
outcome is the respondent’s perception of her standing on a ladder of socio-economic status in 
her community/neighborhood.  The estimated treatment effect is essentially zero, and the 
confidence intervals rules out shifts greater than 10%.  Combining the three outcomes into a 
summary index measure produces a positive and highly significant overall treatment effect on 
control and outlook (Table 6).24 
We also estimate treatment effects on two measures of self-reported physical health status.  
The first is based on the question: “Would you say your health at this time is very good, 
good, fair, bad, or very bad?”  Table 5 shows that treated applicants were an estimated 4.7 
percentage points more likely to label their own health status as “very good”, with a p-value of 
                                                 
22 Here we assume zero education treatment effects on households with no members in the likely university 
age range of 18 to 26. 
23 For evidence from prior studies see Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2003a) on credit program 
participation, and Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006a) on a commitment savings product. 
24 Constructing the index requires an assumption about how to impute decision power for the unmarried, 
since we asked our decision-making power questions only of married respondents.  We impute decision 
power for an unmarried respondent using the mean of the respondent’s treatment cell for married 
respondents; effectively assuming that the treatment effect is the same magnitude (albeit in different intra-




0.26.  The second outcome is based on questions about recent sickness in the household.  The 
coefficient suggests that treated applicants were slightly more likely to report sickness among 
household members in the last 30 days, although the point estimate has a p-value of only 0.54.  
Combining the two measures into a physical health index produces a very small and imprecisely 
estimated positive treatment effect (Table 6). 
Finally we construct two measures of current mental health status.  The first is a standard, 
linear measure of depression based a battery of questions from the psychology literature.25  The 
estimated treatment effect on depression is very small, and the confidence interval includes a 
maximum shift of 15%.  The second mental health measure is linear stress scale that is again 
based on a standard battery of questions.  Here we find our first hint of a negative treatment 
effect: the point estimate implies an 8% increase in stress, with a p-value of 0.11.26  Our sample 
sizes are relatively small on the mental health measures because we the questions were designed 
to be asked only of targeted respondents, and also were inadvertently skipped for approximately 
half of the remaining sample due to a survey software bug.  Combining the two mental health 
measures into an index produces an estimated negative treatment effect of 0.15 standard deviation 
units, with a p-value of 0.06 (Table 6).  The estimates by sub-group suggest that there may be 
heterogeneous treatment effects; e.g., we find significant negative effects on female but not male 
borrowers. 
The final row of results in Table 6 shows estimated treatment effects on the summary index 
that combines all of our outcome measures.  This index captures the estimated average treatment 
                                                 
25 The depression scale includes measures of happiness that merit separate mention given the recent interest 
in using happiness as an outcome measure.  We find positive but insignificant treatment effects on the 
happiness scale, and on a dummy for being happy “most of the time”.  As in other datasets, our happiness 
measures correlate strongly and positively with being (self-)employed. 
26 Besides the possibility that servicing debt creates stress (recall that point estimates in Table 3 suggest that 
treated applicants were more likely to be borrowing at the time of the survey), the survey data suggests two 
other potential channels.  One is that increased decision making power may produce conflict.  We asked 
several questions on intra-household conflict; combining the responses into a linear conflict scale produces 
a large, but insignificant, estimated increase in conflict.  A second possibility is that access to credit permits 
spending that borrowers regret ex-post.  The estimated treatment effect on whether respondents “agree a 
lot” that “I often find that I regret spending money.  I wish that when I had cash, I was better disciplined 




effect on a component outcome.  The estimate is highly significant (with a p-value of 0.02), and 
suggests that access to consumer credit improves the average outcome by 0.07 standard deviation 
units.  In one sense the economic magnitude of this effect is somewhat challenging to put into 
perspective, given the lack of randomized and outcome-standardized evaluation of microcredit.27  
But in another sense the magnitude matters less than the conclusion that we can rule out negative 
summary treatment effects over the horizon considered in our survey data (6-12 months).  For as 
discussed at the outset, the default policy approach to consumer credit is to restrict rather than 
subsidize access.   
 
B.  Treatment-on-the-Treated Results 
We can estimate TOT by doubling the ITT estimates, since the difference in treatment 
rates between treatment and control groups is 0.50.  However any TOT results must be 
interpreted with care.  Heterogeneity in treatment effects (as is highly likely if manager 
compliance varied with unobserved applicant characteristics that are then correlated with 
outcomes) imply that the TOT results can not be generalized to all individuals who were below 
the underwriting threshold.  Rather they estimate the impact of credit expansion on the sample of 
applicants deemed creditworthy enough by branch personnel to merit compliance with the 
randomization.  The treatment on the treated estimates should be interpreted as an estimate on the 
type of applicant approved by this subjective process, which may be different than an expansion 
conducted entirely through an objective credit scoring process. 
 
C.  Time-Varying Treatment Effects and Debt Traps? Effects on Credit Scores Over Time  
                                                 
27 On the other hand education and other social policy initiatives are more commonly evaluated using these 
methods.  Randomized education treatments are typically thought to have a large impact if they move test 
scores by 0.2 standard deviation units.  The point estimate for the overall effect of the Moving to 
Opportunity intervention studied in Kling et al was 0.04 standard deviation units on adults (with effects 2-3 
times as large on youths). The closest study to ours is Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006b) in which a 
commitment savings product in the Philippines led to an increase in decision-making power of 0.50 




Despite the fact that our survey measures outcomes several months after loans were due to be 
repaid in full, there may still be some concern that a 6-12 month horizon is too short to capture 
the full cost of loan repayment in some cases.  Similarly, returns to some investments, broadly 
defined, financed with the marginal loans may not be fully realized over 6-12 months.  Indeed, 
some debt trap models imply that marginal borrowing may actually be counterproductive in the 
long-run; i.e., that treated applicants may have worse outcomes than untreated applicants over 
longer horizons.28  So measuring outcomes and estimating treatment effects over longer horizons 
is important.  But survey data are expensive, and increasingly prone to attrition bias as the 
treatment grows more distant in time.  Thus we address the question of time-varying impacts 
using administrative data, using credit scores obtained from a leading credit bureau on nearly 
everyone in our survey sample frame as of two dates: December 31st, 2005 (13-15 months after 
the initial application), and December 31st, 2006 (25-27 months after the initial application). 
Credit scores may be useful outcome measures in three respects.  First, credit scores may 
proxy more directly for ultimate outcomes if they are correlated with said outcomes.  The 2005 
scores are all measured within 9 months of our survey data, and the December 2005 credit score 
is actually negatively correlated (-0.10) with the overall summary index—for those with a score.  
But applicants with a thin credit history are not scored, and having a score is correlated positively 
(0.12) with our overall index.  Second, having a score may not only be privately beneficial (as 
suggested by its positive correlation with the overall index), but socially beneficial, to the extent 
it indicates that private information about the borrower’s creditworthiness has been made public 
to lenders.  Third, debt traps or other delayed realizations of borrowing costs may ultimately 
culminate in borrowers defaulting, so we can estimate whether expanding access to credit in the 
short-run eventually reduces creditworthiness on the longer-run (by inducing defaults). 
                                                 
28 Debt traps refer to a dynamic where borrowers are unable to fully service debt out cash flows, refinance 
or continue borrowing over longer horizons than the original maturity, and ultimately default or bear 




Credit scores are used by consumer lenders in South Africa much as they are in the U.S.  
Scores can range from 300 to over 850.  Our sample had December 2005 and 2006 scores ranging 
487 to 817.29  Our Lender made loan approve/reject decisions with reference to the external credit 
score (along with an internal score, and soft information collected and assessed by branch 
personnel).  External scores had little if any impact on the loan terms offered conditional on 
approval.  The Lender rarely made loans to applicants with scores below 600, and almost never to 
applicants below 550.  Approval probabilities (based on a matrix of the external and internal 
scores) were based on 20-30 point external score bands. 
But the most important effect of external credit scores on creditworthiness in the cash loan 
market likely comes from the extensive margin, since many consumers have credit histories that 
are too thin to be scored.  These consumers do not have any score at all, or are assigned a 3-
category risk indicator by external score provider.  Obtaining an ordinal score increased the 
probability of loan approval in our sample by 19%, conditional on the Lender’s internal score, 
branch fixed effects, and month of application. 
Table 7 provides evidence that our expanding access treatment significantly increased the 
probability of having a score, and had no effect on the score conditional on having a score.  We 
show results for the surveyed sample of 626 households (results on the sample of 787 households 
that we attempted to survey are nearly identical).  Columns 1 and 2 show that marginal applicants 
who were randomly assigned a loan were an estimated 7.9 and 7.1 percentage points more likely 
to have an ordinal score after one year and after two years.  These are large effects given that 10% 
and 12% of the sample lacked an ordinal score.  On the other hand, we find no evidence that the 
treatment changed scores conditional on having an ordinal score.  The 95% confidence interval 
bounds the intention-to-treat effect at a small one; e.g., -11 points is a less than 2% change 
relative to the sample mean.  Scores are nearly normal distributed, so results for logged scores 
produce nearly identical results.  
                                                 





In all, we do not find any evidence that expanding access to consumer credit reduces 
creditworthiness over a 2-year horizon.  If anything the treatment seems to have had a (socially) 
beneficial impact on creditworthiness by increasing the probability of obtaining a credit score.   
 
D.  Impacts on the Lender: Profitability 
As noted at the outset, the Lender implemented this experiment based on the prior that its branch 
staff were overly conservative in applying the risk assessment guidelines provided by senior 
management.  Prior work on retail credit risk assessment suggests that the Lender had every 
reason to be concerned that its risk assessment model was not fully optimized (Allen, DeLong et 
al. 2004).  The particular questions of interest in our experiment are: were the marginal loans 
produced by the experiment profitable?  And were they less profitable than inframarginal loans? 
Table 8 reports our profit estimates for the 172 marginal loans that loan officers originally 
rejected but decided to approve after our randomized second look (Panel A), and for the 1,405 
inframarginal loans to first-time borrowers that loan officers in the experimental branches initially 
approved during the experimental period (Panel B).  Below we refer to the marginal and 
inframarginal loans together as “study” loans. 
We calculate gross revenues on the study loans by discounting all payments made on these 
loans (including principal, interest, and late fees) back to the start date of the experiment.  Since 
the Lender was not credit constrained—in fact it was highly profitable and financed study loans 
out of retained earnings-- we discount using a risk-free rate (the South African Treasury security 
with the most comparable maturity, which was 91 days, with an annual yield of 7.2%, during our 
study period).  Our repayment data ends in May 2005 (due to the merger described above), but by 




90 days past due).  So we assume that no additional payments were collected on study loans after 
May 20th, 2005. 
We then calculate net revenues by subtracting the discounted loan amount advanced to get an 
estimate of profits, assuming no marginal staff costs. 
The question of how to account for marginal staff costs hinges in part on whether there was 
an opportunity cost of staff time.  The Lender did not hire any new staff for this experiment, nor 
did it incur any additional marketing expense.  But there may be a shadow cost if processing, 
monitoring, and enforcement if marginal loans reduce the amount of staff time allocated to the 
same activities on inframarginal loans.  We estimate this shadow cost using the Lender’s estimate 
of marginal labor costs and quantities for each type of activity.   
Whether we account for marginal costs or not, Table 8 suggests two key qualitative findings.  
First, marginal loans appear to have been substantially less profitable than the inframarginal loans 
(Column 1).  Marginal loans were less likely to have been paid back in full (71.5% vs. 76.4%); 
the p-value that the inframarginal repayment rate is in fact higher is 0.08.  The table also shows 
that our point estimates for average loan profitability are higher for inframarginal loans.  The 
table reports the p-value for a test of whether the profit difference between inframarginal and 
marginal loans is different from zero; the probability that it is greater than zero is 0.10.  
Interestingly, Column 2 suggests that the Lender’s screening method did a poor job of 
distinguishing profitable from unprofitable loans at relatively low ex-ante credit scores (defined 
based on the Lender’s matrix of internal and external scores). 
Second, we find substantial, risk-unadjusted profits on marginal and inframarginal loans 
alike.  The question of whether and how much to adjust for risk is important.  From the 
perspective of society, unadjusted profits may be the relevant input into social welfare analysis: 
one usually assumes that the social planner is risk-neutral.  From the perspective of the Lender, 
some adjustment is probably warranted.  Any risk adjustment would presumably increase the 




Lender’s management concluded that our conservatively estimated profit of R201 ($32) per 
marginal loan easily exceeded its hurdle. 
The conclusion that the marginal loans were profitable to some degree would likely be 
strengthened if we had more complete data on additional loans obtained by marginal clients.  In 
principle of course a firm cares about the present value of all expected future transactions with the 
marginal client.  Typically the average profitability of the Lender’s “follow-on” loans was 
substantially higher than on the first loan, as loan sizes and maturities rose and default rates fell 
for more experienced clients.  Our data suggests that marginal clients followed the typical pattern, 
although since the data is truncated at May 2005 we cannot “close the books” on repayment of 
follow-on loans.  
In all the evidence suggests that the marginal loans induced by our experiment were 
profitable, although substantially less profitable than comparable inframarginal loans.  We do not 
harbor illusions that our profitability estimates are precise, as our calculations are based on 
several debatable assumptions.  We detail our best guesses in Table 8 but emphasize that the 
magnitudes presented there are speculative.  Nevertheless the weight of the evidence suggests that 
the marginal loans were profitable to some degree, particularly if one takes the risk-neutral 
perspective of a social planner. 
In any case we believe the main implication of our profit estimates is that consumer lenders 
should seriously consider evaluating their risk assessment models.  Taken together with evidence 
from prior studies that even profitable consumer lenders do not necessarily operate at the frontier, 





Measuring the causal impacts of access to credit is critical for evaluating theory and practice, but 




exogenous variation in the approval of consumer loans.  A lender randomly encouraged loan 
officers to reconsider marginal applications for market-rate, four-month term loans that they 
normally would have rejected.30  Loan officers reconsidered in real-time, and unbeknownst to the 
applicants.  Half of the reconsidered applicants were approved.  We then tracked the behavior and 
outcomes of the treatment (reconsidered) and control (still rejected) groups over the next 6 to 27 
months using administrative data and detailed household surveys. 
Our results corroborate the presence of binding liquidity constraints and suggest that 
expanding credit supply improves welfare.  There are three key sets of findings.  First, control 
applicants who were randomly denied by our cooperating lender did not simply obtain credit 
elsewhere; conversely, treatment applicants who were randomly assigned a second look increased 
their total borrowing, and changed their lender type composition, in the 6-12 months following 
the experiment.  Second, we find that treated applicants benefited from the expanded access.   We 
use household surveys to measure a range of tangible and subjective outcomes 6-12 months 
following the experiment, and find significant and positive effects on job retention, income, food 
consumption quality and quantity, and household decision-making control and mental outlook.  
We find negative effects on other aspects of mental health (principally stress).  But on net the 
impacts are significant and positive.  We do not find any evidence that the positive 6 to 12 month 
impacts are transitory and driven by borrowers who have yet to realize the full costs of 
borrowing.   Over 15 to 27 month horizons we find that the treatment increased the likelihood of 
having an external credit score, and had no effect on the score itself.  Third, our evidence suggests 
that the marginal loans were profitable.  This is particularly true if we take the risk-neutral 
perspective of a social planner.   
Most importantly, we do not find any evidence that the net effects of expanded access to 
expensive consumer credit are negative.  The default policy prescription in South Africa and 
                                                 
30 The Lender conducted the experiment on a pool of initially denied applicants and hence did not deny 





much of the rest of the world (including parts of the U.S.) is to restrict access based on the 
presumption that vulnerable consumers overborrow in these markets.  Our evidence casts doubt n 
this presumption and suggests that revealed preference carries the day: our consumers who 
borrowed at 200% benefited from doing so, at least relative to their outside options.   
It is not clear whether these results will extrapolate to other settings.  We experimented in a 
particular setting that is not necessarily representative of other markets, populations, or 
interventions.  But our findings are provocative because practitioners and policymakers tend to 
view our setting as one where the deck was stacked against finding beneficial impacts.  Our 
Lender was for-profit, the intervention was blunt, the credit was expensive, the market was 
somewhat competitive, and we targeted consumers rather than entrepreneurs. 
Replications will be required to determine whether our findings generalize.  Future work 
would also do well to explore some additional mechanisms behind the effects of expanding 
access to credit.  For example, collecting additional data on preferences and on borrowing sources 
would help shed some light on whether marginal borrowers benefit because they have time-
consistent preferences, or because splurges borne of time-inconsistent preferences are less costly 
when financed at formal market rates that are strictly lower than informal market rates. 
Our main point of generality is methodological.  A field experiment followed data collection 
can be used to identify any motivation for, and impacts of, credit market interventions.  This 
approach should build on related work that identifies the presence or absence of specific market 
failures (Karlan and Zinman 2006b) and how targeted populations make decisions (Bertrand, 
Karlan et al. 2005; Karlan and Zinman 2006a).  Taken together this layered approach can identify 
markets that are ripe for welfare-improving interventions, design mechanisms that are most likely 
improve efficiency, and then evaluate whether the mechanisms actually work.  The layered 
approach is costly but worth it.  Donors, governments, and firms allocate billions of dollars to 
credit market interventions each year.  Even if one takes a pessimistic view of external validity 




markets would fund the experiments and surveys needed to generate specific and scientific 




Data Appendix.  
Construction of Component Outcome Measures and Indices 
 
All outcomes described in this appendix are based on data collected from the follow-up 
household surveys described in Section III-B. 
 
Measuring the Component Outcomes Evaluated in Table 5 
The poverty line is the household size-specific 'minimum living level', as computed by 
the Bureau of Market Research of the University of South Africa (UNISA) in 2001.  We 
compare households to the poverty line for annual income using a measure of total 
household income that is constructed by querying for monthly income over the prior 12 
months in several different categories of employment, business, property, and program 
income. 
 
We construct the percentile of total household earnings reported since entering the 
experiment using questions on the wage and self-employment earnings of each household 
member, over the prior 12 months.  The percentile is based on the distribution of those 
with non-zero earnings; we set the percentile to zero for 59 households that report zero 
earnings over the past 12 months. 
 
The decision-making scale was based on questions asked to married marginal applicants 
about how the household decides about: routine purchases, expensive purchases, giving 
assistance to family members, family purchases, recreational use of money, personal use 
of money, number- of children, use of family planning, method of family planning, 
assistance given to relatives, decision to borrow, amount to borrow, and where/who to 
borrow from. The value for each item takes zero if the decision-making is done by the 
respondent's spouse or someone else in the household, one if the decision-making is done 
by the couple, and two if decision-making is done by the respondent.  The index is the 
sum of the 13 responses (range: 0-26). The decision-making scale questions were not 
asked in the 73 surveys answered by a household member who was not the marginal 
applicant (this occurred when the marginal applicant was unavailable/had moved 
out/etc.).  We could not construct the index for 7 married respondents due to one or more 
missing components. 
 
The optimism scale ranges from 6 to 30 and is based on the responses to 6 questions.  
Respondents rank their level of agreement with statements on a 1-5 scale from, and the 
optimism score is the sum of the responses.  See Scheier, Carver, and Bridges (1994) for 
details on scale construction and validation.  
 
The community socio-economic ladder scale ranges from 1 to 10 and is based on the 
response to the question “Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in your 
community or neighbourhood. People define community and neighbourhood in different 
ways; in this instance we are referring to the people that live around you or with whom 
you interact on a regular basis. Imagine everyone in your community or neighbourhood is 
standing somewhere on this ladder.  At the TOP of the ladder are the people who are the 




jobs. At the BOTTOM are the people who are the worst off-who have the least money, 
least education, and the least respected jobs or no job.  The higher up you are on this 
ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very top. The lower you are, the closer you 
are to the people at the very bottom. Where would you place yourself on this ladder, 
compared to others in your community or neighbourhood?”. 
 
The depression scale ranges from 0 to 60 and is based on the responses to 20 questions.  
Respondents indicate how often they felt like a certain way during the past week, with 
“most or all of the time” scoring 3 points and “rarely or none of the time” scoring 0 
points.  We then sum the scores and multiply the scale by -1 so that higher score reflect 
less depression.  See Radloff (1977) for details on scale construction and validation. 
  
The stress scale ranges from 0-40 and is based on the responses to 10 questions.  
Respondents indicate how often they felt or thought in a certain way during the last 
month, with “very often” scoring 4 points and “never” scoring 0 points.  We then 
multiply the scale by -1 so that higher scores reflected less stress.  See Cohen and 
Williamson (1988) for details on scale construction and validation. 
  
Stress, depression, and optimism questions were not asked in the 73 surveys answered by 
a household member who was not the marginal applicant (this occurred when the 
marginal applicant was unavailable/had moved out/etc.).  The stress, depression, and 
optimism scales variables are missing 7, 13, and 2 additional observations because one or 
more of the scale components is missing.  Due to a survey software bug, we are also 
missing stress and depression variables for the 46% of the sample that was randomly 
assigned to be asked stress and depression questions after questions on borrowing. 
 
Combining the Component Outcomes into the Indices Evaluated in Table 6 
Indices are created by adding related outcome measures together (after imputing missing 
values and standardizing as detailed in Section III-E), and taking their unweighted 
average. 
 
Components for each index are listed in Table 5. 
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Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Head of household employed 68.2% - 75.0% - 66.3% - 73.8% (a) 68.9% (a)
Female head of household 37.7% - 31.8% - 39.4% -
Years of education of head of household 9.8 11 9.7 11 9.8 11
Age of head of household 44.4 42 41.0 39 45.3 43
Number of kids in household 1.9 2 1.6 1 2.0 2
Number of household members 5.4 5 4.8 4 5.6 5 3.8 (d) 3.9 (d)
Any member of household is self-employed 16.7% - 13.3% - 17.7% - 15.7% (e) 17.7% (e)
Race of loan applicant
African 65.0% - 70.6% - 63.4% - 79.3% (f) -
White 4.8% - 4.4% - 5.0% - 9.5% (f) -
Indian 4.7% - 5.0% - 4.6% - 2.4% (f) -
Coloured 25.4% - 20.0% - 27.1% - 8.8% (f) -
Monthly household income R 4,359 R 2,153 R 3,348 R 1,713 R 4,646 R 2,200 R 3,750 (c) R 2,167 (c)
Average individual monthly salary in the formal sector, 2004 R 6,882 (b)
Race varies a lot by province in South Africa; e.g., our sample includes relatively high proportion of mixed race "Coloured" individuals because Capetown branches participated in the experiment.
Average exchange rate during project and survey: 1 US$ = 6.3 Rands.
Notes on monthly household income
Respondents were asked separately about:
     - permanent employment salary and bonuses,
     - casual employment salary and bonuses,
     - income from self-employment,
     - many different grants and pensions (unemployment, old age, disability, child rearing, etc.),
     - rent and remittances received,
     - agriculture income, and
     - any other type of income.
Lettered notes:
(a) Employment rate of the active population. Source: Labour force survey, September 2004.
(c) In Rands of 2000. Inflation for the period 2000-November 2004: 25%.
(d) Average household size. Census 2001.
(e) Calculated from the Labour Force Survey, September 2004. 
(f) South African population. Source: Mid-year population estimates, South Africa 2004, Statistics South Africa.
(b) Average earnings for non-agriculture formal employees, November 2004. Source: Quarterly Employment Statistics, Statistics South Africa, November 2005.
Applicants with a 50% 
chance of approval South Africa
Blacks in 
South Africa
Sample frame (in experiment, 
and surveyed)
Applicants with a 25% 
chance of approval
The experiment sample varies from 578 to 626 depending on missing values in the survey.
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Marital status -- Divorced 0.056 -0.006
(0.129) (0.099)
Marital status -- Married 0.036 0.053
(0.045) (0.039)
Marital status -- Separated -0.194 0.021
(0.158) (0.159)
Marital status -- Widow 0.104 0.136
(0.118) (0.111)
Number of dependents 0.000 0.012
(0.013) (0.011)
Non-african race -0.035 -0.049
(0.040) (0.034)
Age of applicant -0.003 -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Monthly gross income at application (000s) 0.008 0.018**
(0.008) (0.007)




Observations 786 786 787
















Reject Reject 455 321 134
Reject Approve 7 0.98 6 0.98 1 0.99
Approve Approve 172 144 28
Approve Reject 153 0.53 136 0.51 17 0.62
Table 2. Experiment Validity and Compliance
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. Sample contains 787 marginal applicants eligible for the treatment (i.e., for loan
approval). Each column reports marginal effects for a single regression of the dependent variable
listed in the column heading on a set of covariates comprised of: 1) the right-hand-side variables
listed in the row headings; 2) the credit score categories that determined the treatment assignment
probability (these are not shown). Running probits produces qualitatively similar results. Non-
african races include white, indian, coloured, and indian/coloured. 'Single' is the omitted marital
status category.  One observation is dropped from columns (1) and (2) due to missing race.
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Table 3. Intention-to-Treat Effects on Borrowing and Access
Panel A. Effects on Borrowing and Composition
Mean depvar Full sample Gender Income Credit score
for full sample Female Male High Low High Low
Dummy 'got a loan'
Since date of application All sources 0.352 0.041 0.023 0.078 0.009 0.079 0.030 0.064
(0.040) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059) (0.060) (0.056)
Microlender 0.184 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.131** 0.155*** 0.107**
(0.034) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.052) (0.050) (0.046)
Other formal sources 0.172 -0.055* -0.098** 0.010 -0.077* -0.040 -0.106** -0.015
(0.032) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047) (0.040) (0.046) (0.044)
Informal sources 0.032 0.011 0.027 -0.001 -0.002 0.030 0.016 0.014
(0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021)
At time of survey All sources 0.333 0.027 0.028 0.059 -0.034 0.067 0.015 0.050
(0.040) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.059) (0.055)
Microlender 0.150 0.118*** 0.129*** 0.119*** 0.094** 0.142*** 0.122*** 0.128***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Other formal sources 0.198 -0.047 -0.083* 0.008 -0.088* -0.026 -0.090* -0.007
(0.033) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.042) (0.050) (0.046)
Informal sources 0.015 -0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.013 -0.013*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.008)
Sample size 626 626 311 315 314 312 283 343
Number of observations (range) 618-622 618-622 305-309 309-315 307-311 307-311 279-282 335-341
Number of loans
Since date of application All sources 0.506 0.141** 0.141 0.178* 0.086 0.225** 0.160 0.130
(0.069) (0.096) (0.101) (0.088) (0.109) (0.101) (0.096)
Microlender 0.230 0.211*** 0.216*** 0.202*** 0.185*** 0.254*** 0.263*** 0.173***
(0.051) (0.074) (0.072) (0.062) (0.086) (0.080) (0.067)
Other formal sources 0.210 -0.069* -0.101* -0.004 -0.081 -0.065 -0.127** -0.026
(0.041) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.060)
Informal sources 0.053 0.010 0.039 -0.016 -0.003 0.039 0.028 -0.000
(0.025) (0.026) (0.045) (0.018) (0.043) (0.029) (0.039)
At time of survey All sources 0.421 0.077 0.042 0.156* 0.014 0.114 0.059 0.113
(0.057) (0.077) (0.086) (0.084) (0.075) (0.085) (0.079)
Microlender 0.166 0.133*** 0.129** 0.149*** 0.114** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.137***
(0.036) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.046) (0.054) (0.048)
Other formal sources 0.229 -0.057 -0.104** 0.018 -0.101* -0.039 -0.119** 0.005
(0.041) (0.053) (0.061) (0.060) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059)
Informal sources 0.018 0.001 0.014 -0.009 0.000 0.004 0.022 -0.018
(0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011) (0.022) (0.025) (0.011)
Sample size 626 626 311 315 314 312 283 343
Number of observations (range) 609-621 609-621 303-309 306-312 304-311 305-310 278-282 331-339
Panel B. Effects on Perceptions
Mean depvar Gender Income Credit score
for full sample Female Male High Low High Low
0.201 0.128*** 0.142*** 0.106* 0.058 0.219*** 0.098* 0.155***
(0.037) (0.048) (0.058) (0.049) (0.059) (0.054) (0.053)
0.535 -0.010 -0.044 0.013 0.016 -0.062 -0.020 -0.001
(0.045) (0.062) (0.067) (0.062) (0.064) (0.067) (0.062)
0.232 -0.112*** -0.099* -0.105** -0.082* -0.132** -0.083 -0.134***
(0.036) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046) (0.057) (0.054) (0.048)
0.724 -0.062 -0.070 -0.056 -0.155*** 0.056 -0.132** 0.005
(0.040) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059) (0.060) (0.054)
Number of observations (range) 538-539 538-539 277-279 260-261 262-268 271-276 244-248 291-294
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All results obtained using OLS to estimate the ITT model detailed in equation
(1); each cell presents the estimated treatment effect from a single regression. All regressions include controls for: month of application with the Lender, month of survey, and treatment
assignment probability. Running probits for the binary outcomes produces qualitatively similar results. The number of observations varies depending on missing values in the survey data.
Perception questions were only asked in the 553 cases where the treated applicant could be found (in 73 other case a household member was surveyed). The income cutoff point is the median
income measured at application. The credit score represents the quality of the application, along two dimensions: (1) the credit bureau score, and (2) an internal score computed by the
Lender. The credit score cutoff point separates applicants in the two lowest categories from applicants in the three higher categories.
Full sample
Respondent would borrow from other formal 
sources (excluding microlenders) if needed a loan
Respondent would borrow from informal sources if 
needed a loan
Respondent would be able to borrow from friends 
or family if needed
Respondent would borrow from microlender if 
needed a loan
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Table 4. Loan Uses








Pay other debts 28.3% 31.7% 27.7% 15.2%
Transportation 19.4% 12.7% 9.2% 24.2%
Events 16.9% 15.5% 17.7% 21.2%
School/university 13.7% 15.5% 12.3% 9.1%
Improve/build house 11.5% 6.3% 18.5% 6.1%
Buy/improve food 9.9% 23.2% 6.9% 0.0%
Bills 7.3% 7.0% 8.5% 6.1%
Durable goods 6.7% 4.2% 10.8% 0.0%
Health care 5.1% 5.6% 3.8% 24.2%
Other personal uses 4.5% 3.5% 6.9% 6.1%
Buy clothes 3.5% 4.9% 3.1% 0.0%
Business uses 3.2% 2.8% 4.6% 0.0%
Total 129.9% 133.1% 130.0% 112.1%
Number of observations (i.e. number of loans) 314 142 130 33
The columns sum to more than 100% because respondents could state more than one use of the loan proceeds. The number of observations for all loans
(314) is not equal to the sum of the number of observations of the sub-samples due to 9 missing values in the variable "loan source." ''Transportation"
includes buying/repairing a car, and public transport. ''Events" include cultural and religious ceremonies (Christmas, funeral, young men initiation, etc.),
and holidays and parties.  ''Other personal uses" include helping families and friends, and miscellaneous expenses.
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Table 5. Intention-to-Treat Estimates for Index Components
Gender Income Credit score
Female Male High Low High Low
Consumption Index
Dummy=1 if household did not experience hunger in past 30 days 0.861 0.058** 0.016 0.085** 0.044 0.058 0.006 0.094**
(0.027) (0.039) (0.038) (0.034) (0.044) (0.039) (0.038)
Dummy=1 if quality of food improved over the last 12 months 0.263 0.037 -0.041 0.108** 0.073 0.015 -0.006 0.078
(0.037) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052)
Number of observations 620-626 620-626 306-311 314-315 310-314 310-312 280-283 340-343
Economic self-sufficiency Index
Dummy=1 if the borrower is employed 0.804 0.108*** 0.107** 0.095** 0.108*** 0.086 0.090* 0.103**
(0.032) (0.047) (0.045) (0.036) (0.056) (0.049) (0.044)
Percentile of household employment earnings since application 45.296 5.008* 3.264 5.666 4.472 3.716 4.543 4.934
(2.609) (3.555) (3.953) (3.516) (3.330) (3.962) (3.503)
Dummy=1 if the household is above the poverty line 0.606 0.074* 0.093 0.049 0.063 0.061 0.056 0.075
(0.040) (0.057) (0.058) (0.049) (0.062) (0.060) (0.056)
Number of observations (range) 587-620 587-620 293-307 294-314 298-310 289-310 270-279 317-341
Investment/durables Index
Dummy=1 if anybody in household is a university student 0.153 -0.011 0.008 -0.044 0.002 -0.035 0.035 -0.060
(0.037) (0.052) (0.050) (0.058) (0.046) (0.059) (0.048)
Dummy=1 if household bought or improved dwelling since application 0.316 0.040 0.050 0.018 0.087 0.001 0.059 0.037
(0.039) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055)
Dummy=1 if anybody in the household is self-employed 0.167 0.022 -0.015 0.051 -0.057 0.090* -0.008 0.046
(0.033) (0.043) (0.049) (0.045) (0.050) (0.048) (0.047)
Number of observations (range) 391-626 391-626 208-311 183-315 189-314 202-312 175-283 216-343
Control and outlook Index
Decision-making scale 13.719 0.865 1.158 1.355* 0.348 1.246 1.135 0.271
(0.695) (1.057) (0.808) (0.836) (1.486) (1.053) (0.939)
Optimism scale 21.969 0.362 0.176 0.566 0.102 0.654 0.030 0.704
(0.339) (0.466) (0.502) (0.485) (0.493) (0.481) (0.502)
Position on community socio-economic ladder 4.403 0.065 -0.061 0.096 -0.225 0.299 -0.103 0.165
(0.182) (0.265) (0.264) (0.272) (0.219) (0.286) (0.239)
Number of observations (range) 178-551 178-551 83-285 95-266 116-269 62-282 97-254 81-297
Physical health Index
Dummy=1 if general health of the borrower is "very good" 0.526 0.047 0.056 0.023 0.046 0.023 -0.005 0.084
(0.042) (0.059) (0.062) (0.057) (0.063) (0.062) (0.058)
Dummy=1 if no household member was sick in previous 30 days 0.517 -0.026 -0.037 -0.000 -0.018 -0.025 0.085 -0.102*
(0.042) (0.059) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.058)
Number of observations (range) 610-625 610-625 308-311 302-314 307-313 303-312 277-283 333-342
Mental health Index
Lack of depression scale -18.828 0.264 -1.249 2.749 0.161 0.056 0.639 -0.197
(1.571) (2.140) (2.429) (2.259) (2.430) (2.663) (2.116)
Lack of stress scale -18.580 -1.414 -1.245 -1.452 -2.178 -0.632 -0.703 -1.926
(0.882) (1.186) (1.313) (1.383) (1.187) (1.399) (1.222)
Number of observations (range) 244-250 244-250 127-133 117 120-122 124-128 112-117 132-133
Full sampleMean depvar 
for full 
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All results obtained using OLS to estimate the ITT model detailed in equation (1); each cell presents the estimated treatment effect 
from a single regression. All regressions include controls for: month of application with the Lender, month of survey, and treatment assignment probability. Running probits for the binary outcomes produces qualitatively similar results. Each
outcome is scaled so that a higher number represent a better outcome. The Data Appendix provides details on outcome measurement. The number of observations varies depending on missing values in the survey data. The income cutoff
point is the median income measured at application. The credit score represents the quality of the application, along two dimensions: (1) the credit bureau score, and (2) an internal score computed by the Lender. The credit score cutoff point
separates applicants in the two lowest categories from applicants in the three higher categories.
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Table 6. Intention-to-Treat Estimates for Summary Index Outcome Measures
Gender Income Credit score
Female Male High Low High Low
Consumption Index 0.117** -0.023 0.232*** 0.132 0.094 0.000 0.210***
(0.058) (0.082) (0.083) (0.081) (0.085) (0.087) (0.080)
Economic self-sufficiency Index 0.190*** 0.188** 0.172** 0.175** 0.157* 0.157* 0.188**
(0.060) (0.087) (0.087) (0.071) (0.090) (0.092) (0.082)
Investment/Durables Index 0.062 0.050 0.041 0.041 0.061 0.095 0.029
(0.053) (0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.074) (0.080) (0.073)
Control and outlook Index 0.172*** 0.159** 0.196*** 0.098 0.241*** 0.110 0.208***
(0.048) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) (0.079) (0.061)
Physical health Index 0.022 0.018 0.020 0.029 -0.002 0.081 -0.017
(0.060) (0.082) (0.092) (0.085) (0.086) (0.089) (0.084)
Mental health Index -0.152* -0.229** -0.099 -0.181* -0.136 -0.105 -0.202*
(0.079) (0.112) (0.114) (0.108) (0.117) (0.115) (0.109)
Overall Index 0.069** 0.027 0.094** 0.049 0.069* 0.056 0.069*
(0.030) (0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041)
Number of observations 626 311 315 314 312 283 343
Full sample
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Results obtained using OLS to estimate the ITT model
detailed in equation (2); each cell presents the estimated treatment effect from a single regression. All regressions include controls for: month of application with the
Lender, month of survey, and treatment assignment probability. Indices are created by adding related outcome measures together (after imputing missing values and
standardizing as detailed in Section III-E), and taking their unweighted average. The outcome measures contained in each index are listed in Table 5; e.g., the first few
rows of Table 5 show that the economic self-sufficiency index is comprised of employment status, employment earnings percentile, and the poverty line variable. The
income cutoff point is the median income measured at application. The credit score represents the quality of the application, along two dimensions: (1) the credit bureau
score, and (2) an internal score computed by the Lender. The credit score cutoff point separates applicants in the two lowest categories from applicants in the three higher
categories.  See the Data Appendix for more details on the construction of the indices.
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Table 7. Treatment Effects on Credit Bureau Scores One and Two Years Later
1= any 1= any
Dependent variable: ordinal score ordinal score score score
in Dec 2005, in Dec 2006, Dec 2005, Dec 2006,
one year impact two year impact one year impact two year impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intent to treat 0.079*** 0.071*** -1.097 -1.537
(0.026) (0.023) (5.163) (5.166)
r-Squared 0.062 0.050 0.021 0.015
mean(dependent variable) 0.88 0.90 629 635
N 625 625 547 561
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS with Huber-White standard errors. All models include controls for randomization probability and month
of application. Applicants with a thin credit history do not have an ordinal score: they have no score at all, or a 3-category risk indicator.
December 2005 is 13-15 months after the treatment (i.e., after the date of application for those in the experiment). December 2006 is 25-27
months after the treatment.
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Table 8. Estimated Profitability of Marginal and Inframarginal Loans
All first loans Low Credit Score High Credit Score
Panel A. Marginal Loans (1) (2) (3)
Count 172 85 87
Proportion paid in full by May 2005 0.715 0.753 0.678
NPV of payments made from marginal borrowers 221,315.01R      104,126.21R      117,188.80R      
NPV of amount lent to marginal borrowers 175,581.39R      81,893.65R         93,687.74R        
NPV of profits, assuming no marginal staff costs 45,733.62R        22,232.56R         23,501.06R        
NPV of profits per marginal loan, assuming no marginal staff costs 265.89R             261.56R              270.13R             
(48.09) (73.95) (62.21)
NPV of profits, with shadow cost of staff time 34,643.62R        16,739.56R         17,904.06R        
NPV of profits per loan, with marginal staff cost 201.42R             196.94R              205.79R             
(48.55)  (74.58) (62.91)
Panel B. Inframarginal Loans
Count 1,405 295 1,110
Proportion paid in full by May 2005 0.764 0.692 0.783
NPV of payments made from marginal borrowers 2,252,494.30R   351,566.65R       1,900,927.70R   
NPV of amount lent to marginal borrowers 1,768,566.20R   289,515.58R       1,479,050.60R   
NPV of profits, assuming no marginal staff costs 483,928.10R      62,051.07R         421,877.10R      
NPV of profits per loan, assuming no marginal staff costs 344.43R             210.34R              380.07R             
(21.52) (32.32) (25.75)
NPV of profits, with shadow cost of staff time 399,181.07R      43,376.07R         355,805.01R      
Profit per inframarginal loan 284.11R             147.04R              320.55R             
(21.67) (32.76) (25.9)
Inframarginal Loan - Marginal Loan Profit Difference 82.70R               -49.90R               114.75R             
P-value of t-test that profit difference between marginal and inframarginal 0.20 0.49 0.22
Standard errors in parentheses. All loans counted here were to first-time borrowers from the Lender and originated at the 8 experimental branches during our study
period: September 21, 2004-November 20, 2004. Marginal loans are those that loan officers originally rejected but decided to approve after our randomized second
look. Inframarginal loans are those to first-time borrowers that loan officers initially approved. Average exchange rate during project and survey: 1 US$ = 6.3
Rands. Payments include principal, interest, and late fees. Payments and amount lent discounted to experiment start date using 91-day South African Treasuries,
which had an annual yield of 7.2% during our study period. We assume no payments made after May 20th, 2005 (our data end date), since here we are counting
only the first loans made to these borrowers, and those first loans that were not repaid by May 2005 were nearly all seriously delinquent. We do not attempt to
adjust profits downward for risk, and note simply that the gap between marginal and inframarginal profits in Column 1 would be larger if we did adjust for risk.
The shadow cost of staff time adjusts for the possibility that time spent processing, monitoring, or enforcing any given loan reduces the amount of time spent on
productive activities on other loans. This is not necessarily a fair assumption, since there appeared to be nontrivial slack (as evidenced by the fact that the Lender
was able to implement this experiment without adding staff). Shadow costs are estimated as follows: (a) processing approved loans: 0.5 hours*R75/hour, (b)
monitoring loans: 0.5 hours*R29/hour, (c) enforcement re: delinquent loans: 1 hour*R29/hour, for any loan that goes into default (>= 3 months past due)
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